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Abstract
We estimate the effect of initial income inequality on subsequent income per capita growth
using sub-national data from Brazil over the period 1970-2000. Holding initial income per
capita and standard confounders constant, we find that sub-national units with a higher share of
income going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile grow more rapidly,
while places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the expense of the middle
quintile get no growth boost at all. We document that both physical and human capital accumu-
lation in places with higher inequality in the lower tail of the initial income distribution outpace
capital accumulation in more equal places, while inequality in the upper tail of the distribution
is uncorrelated with subsequent physical or human capital growth. These results are consistent
with theories on credit constraints and setup costs for human and physical capital investments.
JEL Classifications: D3, O1, O4.
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1 Introduction
A series of seminal theory papers propose different channels through which a society’s degree of ini-
tial economic inequality might impact subsequent income per capita growth. These channels include
aggregate savings and investment (Bourguignon, 1981), human and physical capital accumulation
(Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Barro, 2000; Galor
and Moav, 2004), and income redistribution and social unrest (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Benabou, 1996; Esteban and Ray, 2000; Campante and Ferreira, 2007). Existing
cross- and within-country studies on the relationship between inequality and growth have produced
effect estimates ranging from negative to zero and positive as further discussed below. While re-
search design and data limitations may account for some of this variability, it is also possible that
the effect of inequality on growth is genuinely heterogeneous. Indeed some of the mechanisms above
have different implications for the effect of income inequality on growth, depending on whether the
middle class is richer at the expense of the poor or the rich are richer at the expense of the middle
class. Yet with the exception of Voitchovsky (2005), empirical work has ignored this issue.
This paper investigates whether inequality originating from the lower as opposed to the upper
tail of the income distribution has different effects on subsequent income per capita growth. Greater
inequality as measured by commonly used metrics (e.g. the Gini coefficient) can result from higher
dispersion in different parts of the income distribution, as illustrated in Figure 1. In Panel A, a
theoretical redistribution of income from the bottom to the middle quintile (i.e., the transition from
the Lorenz curve displayed in the solid line to that of the dashed line) implies higher overall income
inequality as captured by the Gini coefficient. However, the exact same increase in overall inequality
can be achieved by redistributing a portion of total income from the middle to the top quintile, as
shown in Panel B. Most existing empirical work does not distinguish whether inequality originates
from the lower or upper tails of the distribution, even though growth theory suggests that impacts
on subsequent growth may well differ. For example, in the presence of credit constraints and setup
costs for human (Galor and Zeira, 1993) or physical capital investments (Banerjee and Newman,
1993), it is conceivable that only inequality in one of the tails matters for growth.
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Consider a stylized economy with three groups of equal size (the poor, the middle class, and
the rich) and the same income within each group. Now assume that the incomes of the poor and
the middle class are initially too low to overcome the setup costs for investing in either human or
physical capital. Put differently, both the poor and the middle class cannot borrow enough to make
the relatively large investments that would be required to make a profit. Now consider another
economy with the same income per capita but with higher inequality at the bottom, i.e. the middle
class is richer while the poor are poorer. In this second economy, the middle class might be rich
enough to overcome the setup costs and make profitable investments in human and physical capital,
thus making the second economy richer than the first economy in the long run. Finally consider a
third economy, again with identical income per capita but higher inequality at the top, i.e. the rich
are richer at the expense of the middle class. Since human and physical capital investments are as
constrained as in the more equal first economy, investment and growth will be similarly limited.
Using sub-national data from Brazil over the 1970-2000 period, we first establish that holding
initial income per capita and a host of standard confounders constant, places with higher initial
income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient exhibit higher subsequent income per capita
growth. Most of the effect materializes by 1991, i.e. there is only a level effect, not permanently
higher growth. We then propose a simple approach to distinguish between the growth effects of
inequality originating from the bottom versus the top of the initial income distribution. The key idea
is to include quintile income shares instead of the Gini coefficient in an otherwise standard cross-
sectional growth regression. This allows for hypothetical income redistributions from the two tails
towards the (omitted) middle quintile while holding other income shares and mean income constant.
We find that the positive effect of overall inequality on subsequent growth is entirely driven by
inequality in the lower tail of the income distribution: compared to more equal places, sub-national
units with a 3 percentage points (one standard deviation) higher share of 1970 income going to the
middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile experience about 3 percent higher income per
capita by 2000. In contrast, places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the
expense of the middle quintile get no growth boost at all compared to more equal places.
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The differential effects of bottom versus top inequality are remarkably in line with our ev-
idence on human and physical capital accumulation. We find that places with a higher share of
income held by the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile experience higher subse-
quent growth in both the number of business establishments and the value of their capital stocks.
On the other hand, a higher share of income held by the top quintile at the expense of the middle
quintile is not associated with increased physical capital accumulation. We also find that places with
higher bottom inequality have a higher share of entrepreneurs (employers or self-employed) at the
outset of our sample period compared to more equal places, while places with higher inequality at
the top have slightly fewer entrepreneurs. Similarly, a higher share of the population attains more
than a primary school education in places with higher inequality in the lower tail of the initial in-
come distribution compared to places where the bottom quintile is richer. Inequality at the top of the
distribution on the other hand is uncorrelated with subsequent human capital growth. Overall, these
results suggest that in Brazil in the 1970s, income inequality at the bottom mattered for investment
and growth, while inequality at the top did not.
The most plausible explanation for this pattern of results is the presence of credit constraints.
Opportunities for investment were rather limited for households at the bottom of the wealth distri-
bution in 1970, since access to credit was not widespread. For example, only 12% of agricultural
establishments received credit in 1970, and only 5% of households in the 1970 census had a mort-
gage. Moreover, the result that bottom inequality has a positive effect on growth and investment
also points to the importance of investment indivisibilities. Credit constraints alone would lead to
the opposite prediction that places where the middle class is richer at the expense of the poor should
exhibit lower quantity and average profitability of investment compared to more equal places (Galor
and Zeira, 1993). In order to further test the credit constraints cum setup costs mechanism, we split
the sample by the average income of the middle quintile in 1970. Since investment indivisibilities
matter in relation to the distribution of absolute income, we would expect effects to be concen-
trated in only a subset of our sample. Our results suggest indeed that the entire effect of lower-tail
inequality on growth comes from the group with the poorest middle quintiles in 1970.
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Another potential mechanism leading to differential effects of top versus bottom inequality is
aggregate savings. Since the propensity to save is increasing and perhaps convex in income (Dynan
et al., 2004; Gandelman, 2017), higher inequality at the bottom might increase aggregate savings
only little, while higher inequality at the top might increase available savings substantially. The sav-
ings channel would actually suggest that inequality at the top should matter more than inequality at
the bottom, which is the opposite of what we find. Increased savings only leads to increased invest-
ment in at least partially closed economies, however, and data for Brazil from the end of our sample
period suggest that capital was already highly mobile across municipalities at that time (Bustos et
al., 2017). According to available evidence, the differential growth effects we find are therefore
unlikely to be attributable to differential aggregate savings. Other channels, such as redistributive
policies carried out at the local level, may have been at work. However, we are not aware of any
theory leading to the differential growth effects we find and we lack data to investigate potential
political economy mechanisms further.
Our paper builds on an extensive empirical literature linking overall income inequality and
subsequent income per capita growth surveyed in Galor (2011). While the studies to date are largely
inconclusive, a recent study by Brueckner and Lederman (2018) finds evidence consistent with the-
ories on credit constraints and setup costs. Using an instrumental variable approach with country
fixed effects, they show that the correlation between the Gini coefficient and subsequent income and
human capital growth is positive in poor countries and negative in rich countries. Another recent
study by Berg et al. (2018) finds that higher inequality reduces growth through reduced education
and increased fertility. The study which is most closely related to ours is Voitchovsky (2005), which
uses the 90/75 income percentile ratio as a proxy for inequality at the top of the income distribu-
tion, and the 50/10 income percentile ratio to proxy inequality at the bottom. For a sample of 21
developed countries, the study shows that under some specifications, inequality at the bottom is
negatively correlated with growth, and inequality at the top has a positive correlation. The main
conceptual difficulty with the Voitchovsky (2005) study is that the regression specifications typi-
cally include percentile ratios along with the Gini coefficient in the same equation. But a higher
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90/75 income percentile ratio while keeping the Gini coefficient constant necessarily implies that
inequality must be lower in other parts of the distribution. As a result, it is not clear what the
coefficient on the 90/75 income percentile ratio is picking up. A similar issue arises in Ravallion
(2012), which explores the impact of various parameters of the initial income distribution on income
per capita growth and poverty reduction in a large sample of developing countries. The regression
specification sometimes includes the initial poverty rate along with the Gini coefficient in the same
equation. But holding initial income per capita constant, countries with a higher poverty rate are
also those with higher overall inequality, as discussed in that study. Moreover, holding both average
income and overall inequality constant implies that countries with a higher poverty rate must have
less inequality somewhere else in the distribution, which further complicates the interpretation of
the coefficients.
The main contribution of our study is its conceptually straightforward approach to analyze the
relationship between left- and right-tail inequality and subsequent outcomes. By replacing the Gini
coefficient with the quintile income shares as our main regressors, we exploit variation in inequality
originating from either tail while keeping initial average income and the other income shares con-
stant. As illustrated in panels A and B of Figure 1, we exploit quantitatively identical differences
in income inequality arising from opposite sides of the income distribution. This implies that the
differential effects of bottom versus top inequality we find are not driven by treating inequality in
the two tails differently. And because our regressions hold income per capita constant, places with
a lower share of income going to the poor and a higher share going to the middle class are places
where the poor are poorer and the middle class is richer not only in relative but also in absolute
terms. This is important because the credit market imperfections cum setup cost theory is based
on absolute income levels. Another advantage of our setting is that we draw on homogeneously
collected census data from a single country. Thus, unlike existing cross-country studies, we do not
face a tradeoff between data quality and sample size, and our results are less prone to measurement
error bias. Ours is also the first study to look at the effects of bottom versus top income inequal-
ity in a developing country context. An additional advantage of our setting is that by comparing
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sub-national units within the same country and state, we can abstract from differences in institutions
at the federal and state level which might be correlated with initial inequality and income growth.
Last but not least, our study also provides the first direct evidence on physical capital accumulation
linking initial income distribution to subsequent economic growth.
A potential drawback compared to cross-country studies is that our results could be driven
by migration. For example, places with high initial inequality at the bottom may experience higher
emigration of the poor and thus higher income per capita in future periods among remaining resi-
dents. It turns out, however, that the effect of initial income inequality on immigration or emigration
is close to negligible in practice as further discussed below. Another caveat is that the sub-national
units we analyze are relatively small (the median population is 11,192) and thus results may not gen-
eralize to the cross-country level. However, education is a positive predictor of growth and Brazilian
sub-national units also experience income convergence as predicted by growth theories, suggesting
that there are at least some common mechanisms linking inequality and growth both within and
across countries. We also show that our results are unlikely to be driven by differential measurement
error at the bottom versus at the top of the initial income distribution. And as in any observational
study there is the possibility that our results are driven by some unobserved confounder, such as
heterogeneity in local tastes for equality. We show, however, that our estimates change very little
if we adjust them to account for potential selection on unobservables as proposed in Oster (Forth-
coming). An important final robustness check is that we also get quantitatively very similar results
when we include entity-level fixed effects and account for potential dynamic panel bias using lagged
regressors as instruments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Brazilian setting, and section 3
describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 4 discusses our approach to analyze
the relationship between left- and right-tail inequality and growth and how we deal with potential
confounding factors. Section 5 presents and discusses our main results, and section 6 presents
evidence on mechanisms. Section 7 presents the results of multiple robustness checks, and section
8 concludes with a discussion of external validity.
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2 The Brazilian Setting
The starting point of our analysis is 1970, which is dictated by the availability of comparable income
data over time as further discussed below. Our units of analysis are the 3,659 Brazilian A´reas
Mı´nimas Compara´veis (AMCs), which are roughly equivalent to Brazil’s municipalities in 1970.
On average, AMCs had about 25 thousand inhabitants at that time, while the median population was
about 11 thousand. 97% of individuals who worked or studied in 1970 did so in their municipality
of residence and so it is reasonable to think of each AMC as a small separate economy. Although
today Brazil is a middle-income country with a large urban population, this was by no means true in
1970 when a large fraction of the population lived in poverty, and almost half resided in rural areas.
The level of education was also extremely low. In particular, AMCs had an average educational
attainment of individuals above 25 years old of only 1.37 years, and an illiteracy rate of 44% for
people above 15.
Several mechanisms driving the relationship between income inequality and growth might op-
erate within AMCs. First, there was ample room for growth driven by the accumulation of human
and physical capital. However, opportunities for investment were rather limited for households at
the bottom of the wealth distribution, since access to credit was not widespread. For example, in the
agricultural sector where 42% of the workforce was employed in 1970, only 12% of establishments
received credit during that year.1 Moreover, a recent paper by Skoufias et al. (2013) shows that a mi-
crofinance access expansion in the northeast of Brazil in 1998-2003 increased the total use of credit
and firm profits, consistent with the existence of binding credit constraints for small enterprises. The
firms in their sample are self-employed entrepreneurs with less than five employees and in 1997 less
than 4% of these firms had borrowed in the last three months from formal or informal sources.2
The existence of credit constraints for relatively poor microentrepreneurs is also confirmed in other
1We obtained the share of the workforce employed in agriculture from the 1970 population census, and the share of
agricultural establishments that received credit from a report summarizing the findings of the 1970 agricultural census.
Although there is no information on credit for firms in other sectors of the economy, the fact that only 5% of households
in the 1970 census had a mortgage (i.e., the owners were still paying for it) provides further evidence on how limited
access to credit was in this period.
2The authors of this study rely on a survey called Economia Informal Urbana that surveys more than 40,000 individ-
uals which reported owning a micro-enterprise with up to five employees in 1997.
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developing countries by a series of recent papers that randomly allocate grants to small firms. In
particular, the studies of McKenzie and Woodruff (2008), De Mel et al. (2008), and Fafchamps et
al. (2014) in Mexico, Sri Lanka and Ghana find that the marginal returns to capital for these small
firms exceed the market interest rates, indicating the presence of binding credit constraints.3 As can
be seen in Appendix Table A.2, the firms targeted by these studies are comparable to the small firms
in the Brazilian study of Skoufias et al. (2013), and this is especially true in the Mexican study by
McKenzie and Woodruff (2008). The available evidence thus suggests that credit constraints were
likely binding for a large fraction of Brazilians in our period of study. Together with setup costs,
inequality in the lower or upper tail of the income distribution might therefore lead to very different
growth dynamics as argued in Galor and Zeira (1993), for example.
An important part of the literature has devoted attention to the role of political forces in ex-
plaining the relationship between inequality and economic development (Persson and Tabellini,
1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Benabou, 1996, among others). In particular, these studies posit
that more unequal societies face higher pressure for redistribution, which in turn generates distor-
tions and hampers growth. Although Brazil was under a military dictatorship from 1964 until 1985,
local elections were still held in most municipalities. Furthermore, while only 2.6% of total revenues
were raised by municipal taxes, around 12%-17% of total public spending was done by municipal
governments (Hagopian, 1996). So even though within-AMC inequality in the 1970s could not
impact local taxation in a relevant way, it might still affect the composition of spending and thus
economic development. While we do not mean to downplay the role of redistributive policies in
mediating the effect of local inequality on subsequent growth, it is not clear from a theoretical per-
spective how inequality generated at the bottom as opposed to the top of the income distribution
would interact with spending decisions at the AMC level. Furthermore, lack of information on
spending at the local level for this period does not allow us to explore this issue further.
3Other studies examining the impact of making microcredit more accessible for poor households (mostly business
owners or people who intended to start a business) find positive impacts on business profits, indicating the presence of
binding credit constraints as well (Banerjee et al., 2015).
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis relies on the 25% sample of the 1970 and 1980 Brazilian censuses obtained from the
Brazilian Statistical Agency (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estadı´stica, IBGE), and on AMC-
level statistics published by IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada).4 The starting point of
our analysis is 1970 since this is when the first round of the Brazilian census with precise information
on individual incomes was conducted.5 Our units of analysis are the 3,659 Brazilian AMCs, which
are themselves based on all existing municipalities from 1970 to 2000. Since many municipalities
split or merged with others after 1970, performing our analysis at the AMC-level allows us to keep
the borders constant and follow the same geographical units over time.6
When working with the 1970 25% census sample we first match the 3,974 municipalities ap-
pearing in this census to their corresponding AMCs.7 This census investigated the monthly monetary
income for all individuals 10 years and older and asked for: (i) the income of the last month for those
who earn a fixed income (e.g., salaries, pensions, etc.); (ii) the average monthly income in the last
twelve months for those who receive variable income (e.g. professionals’ fees, sale and brokerage
commissions, payments for services rendered, etc.); and (iii) the monthly average of other regular
sources of income such as routine donations, rents, dividends, etc. Income in kind was not included.
We construct the per capita family income distribution for each AMC in 1970 by dividing the sum
of the individual incomes of all family members living in the same household by the number of
family members.8 This way, all family members living under the same roof have the same per capita
income. We exclude from our analysis those individuals living in collective dwellings (e.g. hotels,
hospitals, nursing homes), which amount to 1.89% of our sample. We also exclude individuals liv-
ing in a private dwelling who are unrelated to the family head (tenants and domestic servants) and
who account for 2.19% of all individuals. As a robustness check, we include individuals living in
collective dwellings and non-family members living in private dwellings. We then construct three
4Available at http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/.
5In the previous census round in 1960, income was reported in only eight categories.
6Brazil had 3,974 municipalities in 1970, and 5,507 by 2000.
7We match municipality and AMC codes using the Data Zoom program developed by the Department of Economics
at PUC-Rio, available at http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/datazoom/english/.
8Only 1.68% of individuals who report having a source of income do not report their earnings.
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main indicators from each AMC’s per capita family income distribution, using the appropriate ex-
pansion weights provided by IBGE. First, we calculate the average per capita family income in 1970,
which we express in R$ of 2000. Second, we construct the 1970 AMC Gini coefficient,9 and third
the share of total AMC income held by each of the quintiles. We also calculate an approximation
to the Gini coefficient using these quintiles shares.10 Unlike subsequent censuses, incomes above
Cr$ 9,998 are top-coded at this value,11 affecting 0.04% of employed individuals. As a robustness
check, we adjust top-coded incomes, multiplying them by a factor of 2.15 so that individual incomes
in the top 20% follow a Pareto distribution.12 We also use the 1970 census to compute the share of
occupied individuals working in each of the 16 economic sectors detailed in the census, which we
use as controls in the robustness checks we perform in Section 7.2.13
We apply the same procedure to the microdata from the 1980 25% long-form sample to obtain
the per capita family income distribution of each AMC. We then compute a series of per capita
income percentiles and poverty rates for each AMC. For computing poverty rates, we use three
different poverty lines: (i) half of the Brazilian minimum wage in September 1991; (ii) US$ 2 a day
at 2005 PPP, which is the median poverty line amongst developing countries based on a compilation
of national poverty lines in Ravallion et al. (2009); and (iii) US$ 1.25 a day at 2005 PPP, the mean
poverty line for the poorest 15 countries. The first of these was obtained from IPEA, whereas the
others were taken from Ravallion (2012). We also rely on the 1980 census 25% sample to study
the migration patterns across AMCs between the 1970 and 1980 censuses. More specifically, we
compute immigration and emigration rates for each AMC between 1970 and 1980. Since the 1980
census asks individuals how long they have been living in their current municipality, we count all
individuals in a particular AMC who report that they were not living in their current municipality
9We use the ineqdec0 code written by Stephen Jenkins for this calculation.
10Define Qn as the share of total AMC income held by quintile n. Then Gini ≈ 0.8× [Q5+0.5Q4−0.5Q2−Q1].
11All figures in the 1970 and 1980 census are reported in Cruzeiros (Cr$), Brazil’s currency at the time. We converted
all figures to Brazilian Reais (R$) of 2000 using the guidelines employed by the 1998 “Atlas de Desenvolvimento
Humano no Brasil.”
12This methodology is commonly used by researchers working with CPS data in the US. Examples include Katz and
Murphy (1992), Autor et al. (2008), and Autor and Dorn (2013).
13These sectors are agriculture and forestry; gathering of wild growing products; hunting and fishing; mining and
quarrying; manufacturing; construction; public utilities; wholesale and retail trade; services; transporting and communi-
cations; education, health and social activities; public administration, legislation and justice; national defense and public
safety; real estate, financial and insurance activities; liberal professions; and other activities.
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in 1970 as immigrants. Individuals who are younger than 10 years old in 1980 and belong to a
family in which the head is an immigrant are considered immigrants as well. We calculate an
AMC’s immigration rate as the ratio between the number of immigrants in 1980 and the AMC’s
total population in 1970. Furthermore, the census also asks people who have been living in their
current municipality for less than 10 years to specify the municipality in which they were previously
residing. Thus, for each AMC, we can calculate the number of people who were living there in 1970
and left. We use this to calculate the emigration rate, which is simply the number of emigrants of an
AMC divided by the 1970 population. A caveat for this measure is that the municipality of origin
is missing for approximately 19% of all immigrants. Since we cannot trace these people to their
municipality of origin, our emigration rate does not include these observations in the numerator.
We also calculate AMCs’ fertility and mortality rates, to uncover the population dynamics in this
period. The fertility rate is the ratio between the number of AMC natives who are less than 10 years
old in 1980 and the population in 1970. The mortality rate is therefore the ratio between the change
in population between 1970 and 1980 not accounted for by fertility and migration, divided by 1970
population.14
From IPEA we obtain the following 1970 AMC-level control variables, which we use in all
our regressions: average years of schooling of individuals aged 25 and above, illiteracy rates for
people 15 years and older, total population, the percentage of people living in urban areas, and life
expectancy. We also obtain a set of time-invariant AMC-level controls such as latitude, longitude,
distance to the state and federal capitals, and an indicator for whether the AMC is located on the
coast. Our main outcome variables consist of mean per capita family income at the AMC-level for
1980, 1991 and 2000, which are based on the corresponding population censuses. We also obtained
several outcome measures of educational attainment in 1980 at the AMC-level, which are based on
the education level of individuals 25 years and older. Specifically, we use average years of education
and the share of individuals with less than 4, between 4 and 8, and with 8 or more years of education
for each AMC.
Other IPEA data include the number of businesses and the value of capital stocks held by
14This also includes individuals who emigrated from an AMC but do not report their municipality of origin.
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businesses in each AMC in 1970 and 1980 in the agricultural, commercial, manufacturing and ser-
vice sectors, all based on the respective economic censuses.15 Up until 1980, Brazil’s statistical
agency carried out periodic economic censuses covering all firms in each of these sectors. As ex-
plained in detail by the academics in charge of performing these calculations at IPEA (Reis et al.,
2005), the value of capital stocks for agricultural establishments include farmland, buildings, long-
term crops,16 vehicles, machinery, agricultural instruments, and livestock. They deduct the value
of residential buildings within farms, and only consider livestock used for traction or reproduction.
Firms in the agricultural sector include all establishments dedicated to farming, cattle, poultry or rab-
bits, beekeping, raising silk worms, horticulture, floriculture, forestry, and extraction of vegetable
products. When calculating the value of capital stocks for manufacturing, commercial and service
industry establishments, they take into account the value of firms’ capital employed in buildings,
land, machinery and equipment as reported in the corresponding economic censuses. The firms cov-
ered by the commercial census are all the establishments dedicated to the purchase, sale, exchange
or distribution of merchandise through retail.17 Activities considered in the manufacturing census
include the processing and packaging of food products, metallurgical activities, production of phar-
maceutical products, clothes items, etc. Finally, firms in the service sector include all establishment
whose activity involves providing services to people, such as hotels, repair shops, restaurants, and so
on.18 After calculating the value of each establishment’s capital stock, IPEA aggregates these figures
at the municipality level, separately for each sector. In performing this calculation, they consider an
establishment as belonging to a municipality if it is located there. As with all of our income figures,
capital stocks are expressed in real terms (in 2000 R$).
We summarize the main variables for our analysis in Table 1. In 1970 Brazil was an extremely
poor country. The average AMC monthly mean per capita family income in 1970 was 56 R$ (in
15A detailed account on how the value of capital stocks at the AMC-level was backed out from the corresponding
economic censuses by IPEA can be found in Reis et al. (2005).
16Long-term crops are those that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as coffee, oranges, bananas, etc.
17For example, the sales activities of a firm that produces machinery is accounted for in the commercial census only
if the firm sells its products through its own retail establishments, but not if it does so through a wholesaler. Further
explanations can be found in the reports by IBGE on the commercial censuses. For example, at http://biblioteca.ibge.
gov.br/visualizacao/periodicos/63/cc 1980 v4 n15 ba.pdf.
18Further details can be found in IBGE’s reports on the results of the service industry census. See http://biblioteca.
ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/monografias/GEBIS%20-%20RJ/censodosservicos/1980 v05 n03 AC.pdf.
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R$ of 2000), which was approximately 31 US dollars in 2000. Inequality rates were high with an
average Gini coefficient of 0.47 and standard deviation 0.07. Inequality also displayed a considerable
degree of spatial variation across AMCs, as shown in Figure 2.19 During the 1970-2000 period
income per capita more than doubled on average across AMCs. Most of these gains occurred in the
first decade and were accompanied by large increases in physical capital stocks across sectors.
4 Estimation Approach
In order to estimate the effect of initial overall income inequality on subsequent economic growth,
we run the following OLS regression:
ln(ya,s,t) = β0 + β1ln(ya,s,1970) + β2Ginia,s,1970 +Xa,s,1970δ + γs + Ua,s,t (1)
where ya,s,t is the mean per capita family income in AMC a in state s and year t. We estimate
separate regressions with the (natural) logarithm of average per capita family income in 1980, 1991
and 2000, ln(ya,s,t), as the dependent variable. Since we control for baseline income per capita
it makes no difference whether the left-hand side is a future level or a growth rate (except for the
coefficient estimate on baseline income per capita). Ginia,s,1970 is the Gini coefficient in AMC a in
state s in 1970, Xa,s,1970 is a vector of 1970 AMC-level controls, γs are state fixed effects and Ua,s,t
is the influence of unobserved factors on outcomes in year t.
Our coefficient of interest in these regressions is β2, the effect of initial inequality on the
future level of income per capita. There are many potential confounders at the AMC-level in 1970
that could correlate with both initial income inequality and subsequent economic growth, and the
direction of the bias in βˆ2 is unclear. For instance, AMCs with greater income inequality in 1970
might also be places where a higher percentage of the population has low levels of education, and
low education is likely bad for economic growth, biasing βˆ2 downwards. AMCs with high inequality
19Appendix Figures A.1 and A.2 depict the spatial variation in the share of income held by the bottom and top quintiles
in 1970, respectively.
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in 1970 might also be more rural, and growth patterns of rural areas might be different from those of
more urbanized AMCs for reasons unrelated to the society’s initial income inequality. We address
potential omitted variable bias by including standard growth determinants in all our regressions
as well as state fixed effects.20 In particular, Xa,s,1970 includes a set of AMC characteristics in
1970 (average years of schooling of individuals 25 years and older, illiteracy rate for people 15
years and older, population, share of urban population, and life expectancy), as well as other time-
invariant features of each AMC (latitude, longitude, distance from the federal and state capitals, and
an indicator for whether the AMC is located on the coast). In section 7 below we also show results
that include AMC fixed effects and account for potential dynamic panel bias using lagged regressors
as instruments. Nonetheless, to the extent that reverse causality or heterogeneity in local tastes for
equality are important, our effect estimates are best interpreted as partial correlations rather than
causal effects of inequality.
In order to distinguish between effects of inequality originating from either tail of the income
distribution, we take advantage of the fact that the Gini coefficient can be approximated with a
formula based on the shares of income held by each of the quintiles.21 This approximation is:
Ginia,s,1970 ≈ 0.8× [Q5a,s,1970 + 0.5Q4a,s,1970 − 0.5Q2a,s,1970 −Q1a,s,1970] (2)
where Qna,s,1970 is the 1970 share of total income of AMC a in state s held by quintile n. As
can be seen in the first column of Table 2, controlling for state fixed effects and our vector of
1970 AMC covariates, the Gini coefficient and its approximation based on quintile shares in 1970
vary almost one-to-one, with an R2 of almost one. In light of this, decomposing differences in the
1970 AMC Gini coefficients into differences in quintile income shares as in equation (2) allows us
to differentially focus on the growth effects of inequality in the left and right tails of the income
distribution. Throughout our Gini decomposition exercise, the omitted quintile is the middle one.
20Excluding Distrito Federal which is also a municipality in itself, Brazil has 26 states in total.
21As shown by Theil (1967), if there are n groups of individuals and they are ordered in terms of income, the Gini
coefficient can be expressed as
∑n
i=1 yi(
∑
j<i xj −
∑
j>i xj), where xi is the population share of group i, and yi is its
income share. If there are 5 groups, it follows that the Gini coefficient is approximated by equation (2).
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Thus, a lower share of income held by the first quintile implies a correspondingly higher share of
income held by the middle one, and higher overall income inequality, as illustrated in Panel A of
Figure 1. Throughout the paper we refer to this as inequality in the left or bottom tail. The exact
same increase in overall inequality occurs when a higher share of overall income is held by the top
quintile at the expense of the middle one. This is what we call higher inequality in the right or upper
tail, as shown in Panel B of Figure 1. With this intuition in mind, we distinguish between the growth
effects of inequality in the left and right tails by running the following regressions:
ln(ya,s,t) = β0 + β1ln(ya,s,1970) + α1Q5a,s,1970 + α2Q4a,s,1970+
+α3Q2a,s,1970 + α4Q1a,s,1970 +Xa,s,1970δ + γs + Ua,s,t
(3)
which is the specification in equation (1), but replacing the Gini coefficient with four of the quintile
income shares and omitting the middle quintile share. In this regression, our coefficients of interest
are α1 (the coefficient for inequality in the right tail), and α4 (the coefficient for inequality in the
left tail, when multiplied by minus 1). When exploring the correlation between inequality in the left
and right tails with subsequent growth in physical capital, we estimate equation (3) with log capital
stock held by firms on the left-hand side. We do this separately for each sector of the economy
(agriculture, manufacturing, commerce and services), and also for the total capital stock across
sectors. In all these regressions we control for the log of the 1970 value of the capital stocks held by
firms in every sector. We also run the same regressions with the total number of establishments in
each sector as the dependent variable in 1980, controlling for 1970 levels.
When analyzing growth in human capital, we run the above regression for a set of outcomes
capturing the 1980 levels of educational attainment in an AMC, such as average years of education
of individuals above 25 years old, the percent of such individuals with less than 4 years of education
(i.e, less than a primary school degree), between 4 and 8 years (i.e., more than primary but less than
middle school), and 8 or more years of education (i.e., at least a middle school diploma). In addition
to the baseline controls included in Xa,s,1970, we also control for the 1970 proportion of individuals
25 and older with less than 4, between 4 and 8, and 8 or more years of education.
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5 Main Results
5.1 Overall Inequality and Income per Capita Growth
Table 3 shows that there is positive correlation between the Gini coefficient in 1970 and income per
capita in 1980, 1991 and 2000. In particular, AMCs with a 0.07 (one standard deviation) higher Gini
in 1970 had about 3% higher income per capita in 2000. It is clear that the results are concentrated
in the first two decades. Income per capita increased by about 2% by 1980 and by about 3% by 1991
in places where the Gini coefficient was 7 percentage points higher in 1970, with only negligible
additional growth by the year 2000. The results are very similar when using the Gini approximation
based on quintile shares, as can be seen in Appendix Table A.1, which validates the regressions based
on equation (3) below. Taken together, the results suggest that holding 1970 income per capita and
standard confounders constant, AMCs with higher inequality in 1970 end up with higher average
income in 2000, but do not experience permanently higher growth.
Even though our study explores within-country (across sub-national unit) variation, the coeffi-
cients on control variables are very similar to those in cross-country studies. For example, education
is a strong positive predictor of growth and Brazilian AMCs also experience income convergence as
predicted by growth theories. These results speak to the external validity of our study and suggest
that there are at least some common mechanisms linking inequality and growth both within and
across countries. We also note that our regressions account for most of the variation in subsequent
income per capita levels, (R2 of 0.877 in column 5 of Table 3), leaving little room for unobserved
confounders to dramatically alter our estimates of interest.22
5.2 Quintile Income Shares and Income per Capita Growth
Having established a positive correlation between inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient
in 1970 and subsequent economic growth, we now explore whether this effect is different when
22The high R2 in our level regressions is not a mere statistical artifact. If we run this same regression using the growth
in AMC income between 1970 and 2000 instead of the income level as the dependent variable, we still get an R2 of
0.673.
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inequality originates from the lower as opposed to the upper tail of the income distribution. As
explained in Section 4, the third quintile is omitted in our regressions with quintile shares. Thus, a
lower share of income held by the first quintile is matched by an equivalent higher middle quintile
income share, implying higher inequality in the left tail. Therefore, multiplying the coefficient
associated with the share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 by -1 gives us the effect of higher left-
tail inequality in 1970 on future levels of income per capita. On the other hand, a higher share of
income held by the top quintile implies a lower share of income held by the middle quintile, and
thus higher inequality in the right tail. Thus, the coefficient on the share of 1970 AMC income held
by Q5 directly gives the partial effect of higher inequality in the right tail on subsequent outcomes.
The first row in columns 1 through 3 of Table 4 shows that a higher 1970 share of income
held by Q5 at the expense of Q3 had a small and statistically insignificant effect on income per
capita in 1980, 1991 and 2000. Thus, holding the other quintile shares, 1970 income per capita and
standard confounders constant, AMCs with higher right-tail inequality did not experience higher
growth compared to more equal AMCs. Similarly, the coefficient estimates on Q4 and Q2 are also
small and insignificant, suggesting that the distribution of income among the three middle quintiles
has no implications for future growth. On the other hand, the negative coefficient for the share of
income held by Q1 means that AMCs with higher inequality in the left tail of the distribution did
experience higher growth compared to more equal places. In particular, AMCs with a 3 percentage
points (one standard deviation) higher income share of Q3 in 1970 at the expense of Q1 had about
3% higher income per capita by the year 2000. Income per capita increased by about 4% by 1980
with little additional growth by 1991 and a slight and statistically insignificant drop by year 2000.
As with overall inequality, higher left-tail inequality therefore did not lead to permanently higher
income growth. The last row of Table 4 shows that the impacts of left- and right-tail inequality are
not only economically but also statistically different in most specifications. We therefore conclude
that the overall effect of inequality picked up by the Gini coefficient is essentially driven by the lower
tail of the initial income distribution: compared to more equal places, AMCs with a higher share of
income going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile grow more rapidly, while
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places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the expense of the middle quintile
get no growth boost at all.
5.3 Quintile Income Shares and Subsequent Income Distribution
Which income groups benefited from higher income per capita as a result of greater left-tail inequal-
ity? It would be surprising if increased mean income were driven exclusively by the lower tail of
the 1980 income distribution for example. While our repeated cross-sectional data do not allow us
to track incomes of specific quintiles over time, we can nonetheless investigate whether increased
mean income in subsequent periods reflects a general or more localized upward shift of the income
distribution. Since higher growth already materialized by 1980, we focus on this period and substi-
tute income per capita with various 1980 income percentiles on the left-hand side of the regression
equation. As shown in Table 5, more inequality in the left tail in 1970 is correlated with a positive
shift in the top half of the 1980 income distribution. More specifically, in AMCs where the share of
income held by Q3 (Q1) was 3 percentage points higher (lower) in 1970, the 50th, 60th and 80th per
capita income percentiles were all about 6% higher. The 90th and 95th percentiles were respectively
5% and 4% higher in 1980, while at the bottom of the distribution the shift was if anything negative.
Figure 3 plots the magnitude of the shift compared to the average AMC in 1980.
A similar distributional shift emerges when we look at poverty rates in 1980. Table 6 shows
that higher initial inequality in the left tail is associated with significantly lower poverty rates in
1980, but only for relatively broad definitions of poverty. Under our two broadest definitions, for
which the average poverty rates were 60% and 45%, respectively, AMCs where the share of income
held by Q3 in 1970 was 3 percentage points higher had a roughly 1 percentage point lower poverty
rate in 1980. Higher initial left-tail inequality does not correlate with lower poverty rates in 1980
for our strict definition of poverty, under which the average poverty rate in 1980 was 32%. Overall,
these results suggest that higher initial inequality at the bottom was good for the middle and upper
quintiles, and neutral for the bottom quintiles, which is remarkably consistent with the credit market
imperfections cum setup costs theory outlined above.
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6 Evidence on Mechanisms
6.1 Quintile Income Shares and Physical Capital Growth
Given the positive correlation between 1970 inequality in the left tail and subsequent growth in
mean per capita family income, we should observe a similar correlation with growth in physical
and human capital if credit constraints and setup costs were holding back investment in more equal
places. Panel A of Table 7 shows effect estimates for the value of capital stocks held by firms
from different sectors in 1980, holding constant the 1970 value of both total and sector-specific
capital stocks and our other controls. Consistent with the positive growth effect of left-tail inequality
discussed above, we find a positive and sizable correlation between inequality in the left tail in 1970
and the value of capital stocks in 1980 for all four sectors as well as overall. Total capital stocks
were about 12% higher in AMCs where the 1970 income share of Q3 was 3 percentage points (one
standard deviation) higher at the expense of the bottom quintile. The effect of left-tail inequality on
physical capital accumulation arises across sectors, ranging from about 9% in agriculture, to about
15% in the commercial sector, around 24% in manufacturing and 13% in services. On the other
hand, we find much smaller and statistically less significant effects of inequality in the right tail on
firms’ capital stocks.
We next explore whether this increase in capital stocks was driven by the extensive margin (i.e.,
opening of new firms) or the intensive margin (i.e., expansion of existing firms) by running the same
regressions as above but with the number of establishments in each sector in 1980 (in natural logs) as
the dependent variable. Panel B of Table 7 shows that there is a positive and statistically significant
association between left-tail inequality in 1970 and the number of firms in 1980 in all sectors except
for agriculture. More specifically, AMCs in which the third quintile held one standard deviation
higher income (at the expense of the bottom quintile) had between 7% and 8% more establishments
in the commercial, manufacturing and services sectors by 1980. This implies that the expansion of
capital stocks in AMCs with higher left-tail inequality in 1970 was at least partially driven by new
business openings, which is reassuring since one would expect credit constraints to operate on both
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intensive and extensive margins.
In order to further corroborate the results on physical capital investments, we also investigate
whether AMCs with higher bottom inequality had a higher share of entrepreneurs (either employers
or self-employed) at the outset of our sample period in 1970. Column 1 of Appendix Table A.4
shows results for the share of entrepreneurs in the AMC in 1970, irrespective of income quintile.
The negative and significant estimate on Q1 suggests that bottom inequality was associated with a
higher share of entrepreneurs in 1970. Places with a three percentage points higher income share
of the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile had a 1 percentage point higher share
of entrepreneurs. On the other hand, places with higher top inequality had about half a percentage
point lower share of entrepreneurs in 1970. While the magnitude of this differential is small, its sign
lines up with the lower capital accumulation associated with increased top inequality shown above.
Column 2 shows similar results for a slightly reduced sample of AMCs for which the shares of
entrepreneurs by 1970 income quintile can be constructed (in 12 AMCs the two bottom quintiles had
zero income). Columns 3 through 7 show results for the 1970 share of entrepreneurs in Q1 through
Q5, respectively. While higher bottom inequality is associated with a higher share of entrepreneurs
in each quintile, the largest increase comes from the middle quintile, amounting to 1.6 percentage
points in AMCs where Q3 enjoyed a 3 percentage points higher income share at the expense of Q1.
Overall, the results for entrepreneurs in 1970 line up nicely with those on capital accumulation and
suggest that higher inequality at the bottom allowed the middle class to overcome credit constraints
and setup costs that were holding back investment in more equal places.
6.2 Quintile Income Shares and Human Capital Growth
Turning to investments in education, Table 8 shows a similar pattern though with different magni-
tudes. The first column shows that there is no correlation between initial inequality in the right tail
and average educational attainment in 1980. On the other hand, average years of schooling was
higher in 1980 in AMCs that started out with higher inequality in the left tail. Though significant
statistically, this effect is relatively small: AMCs in which the income held by the middle quintile
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in 1970 was 3 percentage points higher (at the expense of the bottom quintile) saw an increase of
0.03 years in average educational attainment of individuals above 25 years of age. Turning to the
regressions in columns 2 to 4, it is clear that this increase in educational attainment was driven
by a smaller proportion of the population with less than 4 years of education (i.e., less than a pri-
mary school degree), and a higher proportion with educational attainment of between 4 and 8 years.
Higher inequality at the top also increased the proportion of the population with more than 8 years
of schooling, but the impact is negligibly small.
6.3 Effect Heterogeneity by Initial Income
The leading explanation for higher growth in AMCs with higher left-tail inequality is that in these
AMCs, individuals in the middle quintile were on the margin of overcoming the credit constraints
and setup costs for investing in physical and human capital. While our regressions compare more
equal to less equal places holding initial income per capita constant, our estimates so far represent
average effects across many different levels of initial income per capita. But the marginal investor
can only be located in the middle quintile in some AMCs, since the absolute level of initial income
in the third quintile varies across AMCs. Following this logic, we split the sample into three groups
according to the average income of individuals in Q3 in 1970. Appendix Table A.3 presents the aver-
age baseline characteristics of these three groups of AMCs. In the poorest group, the AMC-average
of middle quintile average monthly income in 1970 was 19.52 R$ (in R$ of 2000). In contrast,
the corresponding figures for middle quintile individuals in the middle and top terciles of the Q3
average income distribution were 34.20 R$ and 58.83 R$, respectively. Since these differences are
rather large, we would expect growth effects to be concentrated in only one of the three groups if
the credit constraints cum setup costs mechanism is driving the results.
The evidence in Table 9 suggests indeed that the entire effect of lower-tail inequality on growth
comes from one of the groups of AMCs, namely those with the poorest middle quintiles in 1970.
Columns 1-3 show that the correlation between higher inequality in the left tail and subsequent
income per capita is only positive and statistically significant for AMCs in the bottom tercile. In
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the two other groups of AMCs, the coefficients are of the same sign but much smaller in magnitude
and statistically insignificant (columns 4-9). Overall, these results are again remarkably in line with
theories emphasizing credit constraints and investment indivisibilities as the main drivers of the
inequality-growth relationship.
7 Robustness Checks
7.1 Quintile Income Shares and Migration
A first-order concern given our setting is that the results could be driven by differential migration
patterns. For example, places with high initial inequality in the left tail might experience higher
emigration of the poor and thus higher income per capita among remaining residents in future pe-
riods. Alternatively, AMCs with high initial left-tail inequality could be attracting workers with
higher education and higher potential earnings, leading to a selection-driven increase in average in-
come. AMCs with a higher Q3 income share in 1970 (and lower share of income held by Q1) indeed
had about 4.5% more residents in 1980 as shown in column 1 of Table 10. However as shown in
column 2, AMCs with higher inequality in the left tail in 1970 did not experience higher immigra-
tion between 1970 and 1980, and only slightly lower emigration rates as shown in column 3. A 3
percentage points higher share of total income held by the middle quintile (at the expense of the
bottom quintile) was associated with an emigration rate reduction of 0.70 percentage points over the
1970-1980 decade relative to an average emigration rate of about 19%. In fact, the higher growth in
population between 1970 and 1980 experienced by AMCs that started out with higher inequality in
the left tail was mostly driven by a lower mortality rate, as shown in column 5 of Table 10.23
23What we refer to as mortality rate is actually a residual category, namely the ratio between the change in population
between 1970 and 1980 not accounted for by fertility or migration. This includes not only people who passed away in
1970-1980, but also individuals who emigrated from the AMC but did not report their municipality of origin.
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7.2 Controlling for 1970 Sectoral Labor Force Shares
While our main specification controls for the share of an AMC’s 1970 population living in rural
areas, as a robustness check we also account for differences in the initial structure of the economy in
a more flexible manner. As detailed in Section 3, we control for the share of individuals working in
each of the 16 economic sectors defined by the 1970 census. As shown in Table A.5, the association
between inequality in the left-tail in 1970 and subsequent economic growth is robust to the inclusion
of these controls. Our evidence on physical and human capital accumulation featured in Tables A.6
and A.7 is also consistent with our results on inequality, although slightly weaker when it comes to
physical capital accumulation.
7.3 Imputing Top-Coded Incomes
Unlike subsequent censuses, incomes in the 1970 census are top-coded, a practice which affects
0.04% of employed individuals. In order to check whether our results are driven by differential
measurement error at the bottom versus at the top of the initial income distribution, we impute
top-coded incomes and construct new quintile shares. Following the methodology used by Katz
and Murphy (1992), Autor et al. (2008), and Autor and Dorn (2013), among others, we multiply
top-coded incomes by a factor of 2.15, so that individual incomes in the top 20% follow a Pareto
distribution. As can be seen in Table A.8, our main results are robust to these imputations.
7.4 Alternative Definition of the 1970 Census Universe
As explained in Section 3, the 1970 AMC income statistics used in our main specification exclude
individuals living in collective dwellings and individuals who live in a private dwelling but are
unrelated to the family head (i.e., tenants and domestic servants), which in total account for 4.10%
of individuals in the 1970 census.24 While the correlation between initial inequality in the left tail
24Almost 83% of individuals living in collective dwellings in 1970 do not live with their family. These people account
for 1.6% of the total population. Since almost 42% of them do not have any income (as opposed to 4% in the general
population), it is very likely that they are children living in orphanages, incarcerated individuals, etc., and so we exclude
them from our analysis.
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and subsequent growth in income per capita is robust to the inclusion of these individuals, as shown
in Table A.9, inequality at the top is positively correlated with growth in income per capita in some
specifications. However, the coefficients for inequality at the top are much smaller and not robust
across specifications.
7.5 Adjusting for Selection on Unobservables
As discussed in Section 4, there could be many confounders at the AMC-level in 1970 correlating
with both initial income inequality and subsequent economic growth. Although we address potential
omitted variable bias by including standard growth determinants in all our regressions as well as state
fixed effects, we cannot fully rule out the existence of unobservable determinants of AMC growth
that correlate with initial income inequality even conditional on these controls.
In this subsection we follow the approach of Oster (Forthcoming), itself an extension of the
methodology developed by Altonji et al. (2005), to evaluate the robustness of our estimates to po-
tential omitted variable bias. Under the two assumptions that observable and unobservable variables
are equally related to the regressor of interest and that the bias from unobservables is not so large
that it biases the direction of the covariance between the observables and the regressor of interest,
Oster (Forthcoming) develops an estimator that accounts for selection on unobservables. Since the
quintile income shares only capture inequality in the left and right tails if they are conditioned on
the other quintile shares and initial income, we include all of these in the “uncontrolled” regression.
Our estimates change very little if we adjust them to account for potential selection on un-
observables. The bias-adjusted estimate for the first quintile income share in the regression using
mean per capita family income in 2000 (in ln) as the outcome variable is equal to -0.796, down
from -1.065 in the specification that controls for all our observables (column 3 of Table 4). This
change is quite small because the coefficient in the uncontrolled regression is -1.490, which is close
to the coefficient in the regression with the full set of controls.25 In the case of Q5, which was
25If we perform this same adjustment using the growth in 1970-2000 instead of the income level as the outcome
variable, our adjusted coefficient is -0.902, which is even closer to the one in the regression with full controls. The first
reason for this is that the R2 in the uncontrolled regression is much lower when the dependent variable is income growth
(0.083 versus 0.655). And so in that regression, the increase in R2 is massive compared to the change in coefficient
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small and statistically insignificant in our initial regression, controlling for potential selection on
unobservables results in an impact estimate of 0.123, compared to 0.243 in column 1 of Table 4.
7.6 Estimations Using Panel Data
Our main specification estimates the relationship between initial inequality and subsequent growth
by exploiting cross-sectional differences in inequality across AMCs (after controlling for state fixed
effects and standard confounders). In this section we evaluate the robustness of our main estimates to
controlling for unobserved time-invariant AMC characteristics. In particular, we estimate the impact
of within-AMC decadal changes in inequality on subsequent income by using our four census rounds
(1970, 1980, 1991 and 2000).
The results are remarkably robust to alternative estimation approaches. Recall that the 10-year
growth estimates from our cross-sectional estimation in Table 4 are close to zero for top-inequality
and -1.44 for bottom inequality. In the first column of Table 11 we present OLS estimates of the
relationship between AMC quintile shares in period t and mean per capita family income (in ln)
in year t+10. This regression includes year fixed effects, as well as our set of time-varying AMC
controls measured in year t, state fixed effects, AMC geographical controls but no AMC fixed effects.
The estimate for top inequality is close to zero, while the estimate for bottom inequality is -1.66. In
column 2 we include AMC fixed effects and drop the lagged dependent variable, resulting in top-
and bottom-inequality effect estimates of -0.40 and -1.42, respectively. As shown in Angrist and
Pischke (2009), the true effect is likely bracketed by these two specifications.
A potential limitation of relying on within-AMC variation with a lagged dependent variable
is that the estimates of interest may suffer from dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). We address
this problem by using standard first difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system GMM
estimations (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).26 Both the first difference and
estimates. The second reason is that as proposed in Oster (Forthcoming), we also assume that the hypothetical maximum
R2 from a regression of the dependent variable against all observable and unobservable controls is the minimum value
between 1 and 1.3 times the R2 of the regression with observable controls.
26Under the first difference GMM estimation procedure, we take first differences and instrument all explanatory
variables using their lagged levels. The system GMM estimator augments the first-differenced estimations with the
moment conditions of the equation in levels, instrumenting the lagged regressors with their first differences. We assume
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system GMM estimates are remarkably similar to our cross-sectional estimates. Specifically, we find
that using the two dynamic panel GMM techniques, AMCs with a 3 percentage points higher share
of income held by Q3 in 1970 at the expense of Q1 exhibit income per capita between 4% and 5%
higher after 10 years. These estimates are significant at the 1% level. In line with our cross-sectional
estimates, the coefficients for right-tail inequality are small and not consistently significant across
the different estimation approaches shown in Table 11.
8 Conclusion
This study investigates whether inequality originating from the lower as opposed to the upper tail of
the initial income distribution has different effects on subsequent income per capita growth. Using
within-country variation in Brazil, we find that holding average income per capita and standard
controls constant, AMCs with higher inequality in the left tail of the income distribution in 1970
exhibited higher growth in income per capita over the subsequent three decades. At the same time,
there is no correlation between initial inequality in the right tail of the initial income distribution
and growth. We show that our estimates are remarkably robust when we account for selection on
unobservables. Moreover, our results are barely affected if we flexibly control for 1970 structural
differences across sectors, impute incomes that were top-coded in the 1970 census, or use alternative
definitions of the population underlying our inequality measures. Last but not least, we also get
quantitatively very similar results when we include AMC fixed effects and account for potential
dynamic panel bias using lagged regressors as instruments. Consistent with the existence of credit
constraints and setup costs for investing in physical and human capital, we show that AMCs that
started out with higher inequality in the left tail also accumulated physical and human capital at a
faster pace, while right-tail inequality had no such effects.
Whether left-tail inequality would lead to higher growth in other contexts is likely to depend
crucially on the distribution of initial income relative to setup costs. Consider once more a stylized
economy in which the population is divided into three groups of equal size (the poor, the middle
that all regressors are predetermined, and conduct all estimations with the xtabond2 command in Stata.
26
class, and the rich). In the first economy, the incomes of the poor and the middle class are initially
too low to overcome the setup costs for investing in either human or physical capital and so higher
inequality at the bottom boosts investment and growth. But consider a second economy where the
average level of income is higher so that credit constraints only bind for the poorest group. Higher
inequality in the left tail would have no impact on growth in this situation, which is precisely what we
find for AMCs where the average income of the middle quintile is higher. In an even richer economy
in which all groups can profitably invest in human and physical capital, it is conceivable that higher
inequality in the lower tail could even be bad for growth if it results in the poor becoming credit
constrained. This last case might be representative of the U.S. over the 1940-1980 period, for which
Panizza (2002) provides some evidence of a negative cross-state relationship between inequality
and growth. To be consistent with the theory however, the overall effect of inequality should be
driven by the bottom tail and there should be some evidence of reduced human and physical capital
accumulation. In sum, while under credit constraints and investment indivisibilities the relationship
between overall inequality and growth may be genuinely heterogeneous, additional evidence from
the U.S. and other within-country studies are required to further corroborate the theory.
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Figure 1: Gini Coefficient and Inequality at the Top and Bottom of the Income Distribution
Panel A: Higher Overall Inequality Originating from the Left Tail of the Distribution
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Panel B: Higher Overall Inequality Originating from the Right Tail of the Distribution
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Notes: The solid lines display the Lorenz curve of an AMC with average quintile shares in 1970. A´reas Mı´nimas
Compara´veis (AMCs) are roughly equivalent to Brazil’s municipalities in 1970. In Panel A, the dashed line
shows the Lorenz curve of another AMC where the share of income held by the third quintile is 1 standard
deviation (3 percentage points) higher, at the expense of the first quintile, holding the other quintile shares
constant. In Panel B, the dashed line shows the Lorenz curve of yet another AMC where the share of income
held by the fifth quintile is 1 standard deviation (3 percentage points) higher, at the expense of the middle quintile,
again holding the other quintile shares constant.
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Figure 2: Gini Coefficient Across Brazilian AMCs in 1970
Notes: Each unit is an A´rea Mı´nima Compara´vel (AMC) in 1970. Darker areas indicate greater income inequality as
measured by the Gini coefficient in 1970.
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Figure 3: Left-tail Inequality in 1970 and 1980 Income Percentiles
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Notes: The solid line plots the 1980 income percentiles of the average AMC in terms of per capita family income.
The dashed line plots the 1980 income percentiles of an AMC with a 1 standard deviation higher (lower) share of
income held by the third (first) quintile in 1970, which was calculated using the coefficients in Table 5.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variables
Ln (mean per capita family income) – (in 2000 R$)
1980 mean 4.77 0.59 2.32 6.41
1991 mean 4.64 0.59 3.17 6.38
2000 mean 5.01 0.57 3.62 6.86
Ln (aggregate capital stocks in 1980) – (in 2000 R$)
Agriculture 17.68 1.35 0.00 22.69
Commerce 15.07 1.91 0.00 23.18
Manufacturing 15.14 3.17 0.00 24.63
Services 14.41 2.13 0.00 24.08
Total 18.24 1.37 13.11 25.23
Ln (number of establishments in 1980)
Agriculture 6.61 1.14 0.00 10.85
Commerce 3.95 1.29 0.00 10.97
Manufacturing 2.88 1.34 0.00 10.37
Services 3.02 1.58 0.00 10.94
Total 6.86 1.04 0.00 11.89
1980 educational attainment (people 25 years and older)
Average years of schooling 2.07 1.06 0.10 7.20
Proportion with less than 4 years of schooling 0.74 0.16 0.15 0.99
Proportion with 4 or more and less than 8 years of schooling 0.20 0.12 0.01 0.75
Proportion with 8 or more years of schooling 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.48
Explanatory Variables - all measured in 1970
Gini coefficient 0.47 0.07 0.25 0.97
Gini approximation based on quintile income shares 0.42 0.07 0.15 0.80
Share of AMC income held by Q1 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.14
Share of AMC income held by Q2 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.30
Share of AMC income held by Q3 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.27
Share of AMC income held by Q4 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.45
Share of AMC income held by Q5 0.52 0.07 0.14 1.00
Ln (real mean per capita family income) (2000 R$) 3.89 0.54 0.57 5.70
Avg years of education 1.37 0.81 0.00 5.60
Illiteracy rate 0.44 0.18 0.03 0.92
Population (in 000s) 25.45 132.47 0.83 5924.61
Share urban population 0.33 0.21 0.01 1.00
Life expectancy 51.11 4.27 38.40 64.46
Notes: The unit of observation is an A´rea Mı´nima Compara´vel (AMC) over the period 1970-2000. There are
3,659 AMCs.
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Table 2: Income Shares and Income Inequality in 1970
Dependent variable: 1970 Gini coefficient
Gini approximation 1.099***
(0.006)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.925***
(0.015)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.350***
(0.023)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.332***
(0.026)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.696***
(0.029)
Baseline controls
Observations 3,659 3,659
R2 0.976 0.979
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the unit of observation is an AMC
and the dependent variable is the 1970 Gini coefficient. The explanatory variable of interest in col-
umn 1 is the 1970 Gini approximation based on quintile shares, calculated using the formula in (2).
The explanatory variables of interest in column 2 are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each
of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. Baseline controls include state
fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment,
illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance
from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Income Inequality in 1970 and Subsequent Income
Ln (Income)
1980 1991 2000
Gini coefficient 0.313*** 0.415*** 0.447***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.060)
Ln (1970 income) 0.386*** 0.296*** 0.229***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.017)
Avg years of education 0.083*** 0.097*** 0.094***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Illiteracy rate -0.170** -0.224*** -0.468***
(0.069) (0.068) (0.059)
Population (in 000s) 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share urban population 0.363*** 0.380*** 0.290***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.030)
Life expectancy 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Coastal AMC 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.078***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.857 0.849 0.877
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit
of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable is the mean per capita family income
in 1980, 1991 and 2000 (in ln). The 1970 Gini approximation based on quintile shares is
calculated using the formula in (2), and Ln (1970 income) is the mean per capita family
income in 1970 (in ln). All regressions also include state fixed effects and control for
latitude, longitude, and distance from state and federal capital. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Income
Ln (Income)
1980 1990 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.183 0.092 0.243
(0.226) (0.198) (0.170)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.126 -0.026 0.216
(0.328) (0.255) (0.229)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.359 -0.125 -0.349
(0.336) (0.320) (0.277)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.440*** -1.591*** -1.065***
(0.469) (0.453) (0.380)
Ln (1970 income) 0.393*** 0.302*** 0.234***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.017)
Avg years of education 0.085*** 0.098*** 0.094***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Share illiterate -0.151** -0.205*** -0.454***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.059)
Population (in 000s) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share urban population 0.347*** 0.364*** 0.276***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.030)
Life expectancy 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Coastal AMC 0.060*** 0.067*** 0.076***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.858 0.849 0.877
P-value (Q4+Q2=0) 0.362 0.748 0.746
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.055 0.014 0.110
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC.
The dependent variable is the mean per capita family income in 1980, 1991 and 2000 (in ln). The explanatory
variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile
being the omitted category. All regressions also include state fixed effects and control for latitude, longitude, and
distance from state and federal capital. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Income Shares in 1970 and 1980 Income Percentiles
Ln (Income Percentile in 1980)
10th 20th 40th 50th 60th 80th 90th 95th
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 -0.038 0.262 -0.421 -0.576 -0.790** -0.655* -0.123 0.382*
(0.028) (0.688) (0.455) (0.423) (0.382) (0.341) (0.196) (0.216)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 -0.043 0.713 0.278 0.097 -0.148 -0.407 0.050 0.339
(0.065) (0.921) (0.662) (0.626) (0.570) (0.593) (0.274) (0.305)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.067 3.425*** 1.160 0.937 0.342 0.351 0.101 0.134
(0.051) (1.165) (0.827) (0.727) (0.691) (0.312) (0.295) (0.329)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.084 2.986** -1.429 -2.056** -2.173*** -2.316*** -1.707*** -1.325***
(0.060) (1.482) (0.965) (0.829) (0.663) (0.598) (0.425) (0.474)
Baseline controls
Observations 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658 3,658
R2 0.807 0.415 0.665 0.726 0.791 0.856 0.867 0.854
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variables are the different AMC
income percentiles in 1980 (in ln), based on per capita family incomes. The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of
the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income,
average schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and
whether the AMC is located on the coast. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Income Shares in 1970 and 1980 Poverty Rates
Share of people under poverty line in 1980
1/2 the Sep-91 min. wage US$ 2 a day US$ 1.25 a day
(84.73 R$ a month) (50.67 R$ a month) (26.43 R$ a month)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.158*** 0.084 0.014
(0.057) (0.061) (0.062)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.004 -0.037 -0.070
(0.073) (0.082) (0.088)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.188** -0.205** -0.140
(0.090) (0.104) (0.102)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 0.417*** 0.326** 0.106
(0.127) (0.136) (0.132)
Baseline controls
Observations 3,658 3,658 3,658
R2 0.871 0.826 0.699
Dependent Variable Mean 0.604 0.447 0.319
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable
is the share of people in the AMC in 1980 below the poverty line in terms of their per capita family income. The poverty line used in column
1, obtained from IPEA, is half the Brazilian minimum wage in September 1991, whereas the poverty lines in columns 2 and 3 (US$ 2 and
US$ 1.25 a day at 2005 PPP) were taken from Ravallion (2012). The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income
held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for
1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy,
latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Income Shares in 1970 and the Value of Firms’ Capital Stocks and Number of Establishments in 1980
Agriculture Commercial Manufacturing Services Total
Panel A: Value of Capital Stocks
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 -0.079 -1.021 -4.905** -0.548 -0.979*
(0.600) (0.856) (1.991) (1.219) (0.529)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.072 -0.710 -5.201** -0.259 0.174
(0.750) (1.212) (2.500) (1.729) (0.719)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.293 -0.008 -3.288 -0.707 -0.174
(1.006) (1.440) (3.839) (2.032) (0.992)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -3.042** -5.053*** -8.009** -4.380* -3.931***
(1.339) (1.897) (3.839) (2.398) (1.222)
Baseline controls
Lagged value of capital stocks
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.786 0.721 0.626 0.653 0.831
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.083 0.018 0.017 0.142 0.002
Panel B: Number of Establishments
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.587** -0.060 -1.015* 0.370 -0.540
(0.295) (0.407) (0.521) (0.561) (0.343)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.478 0.681 -1.042 1.232* -0.139
(0.395) (0.544) (0.703) (0.739) (0.464)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.762 0.548 -0.118 0.793 0.873
(0.513) (0.705) (0.869) (1.025) (0.543)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.359 -2.654*** -2.577** -3.100** -2.070***
(0.632) (0.909) (1.181) (1.248) (0.732)
Baseline controls
Lagged number of establishments
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.904 0.883 0.816 0.854 0.868
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.790 0.028 0.023 0.103 0.010
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variables in
Panel A and B are the value of the AMC’s private sector capital stocks (in ln) and the number of establishments in 1980 (in ln), for each productive
sector, respectively. All dependent variables were calculated by IPEA from the 1980 economic censuses. The explanatory variables of interest are
the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. Baseline controls include state fixed
effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life
expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. All regressions also control
for lagged dependent variables in all sectors. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
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Table 8: Income Shares in 1970 and Educational Attainment in 1980
Average years Share of people by years of education
of education < 4 years ≥ 4 and < 8 years ≥ 8 years
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.323 -0.002 -0.024 0.026*
(0.225) (0.037) (0.035) (0.014)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.390 -0.031 0.001 0.031*
(0.311) (0.052) (0.049) (0.018)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.388 -0.055 0.062 -0.006
(0.373) (0.064) (0.059) (0.023)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.091** 0.177** -0.148** -0.029
(0.491) (0.079) (0.075) (0.029)
Baseline controls
Lagged education controls
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.935 0.925 0.897 0.886
Dependent Variable Mean 2.073 0.742 0.196 0.062
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC. The
dependent variables measure the average educational attainment in 1980 for individuals 25 years and older. The explanatory
variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted
category. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling
attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and
federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. All regressions also control for lagged educational attainment
variables (i.e., share of people according to their educational attainment in 1970). Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 9: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Income – Heterogeneous Effects by Average Income of Third Quintile in 1970
Q3 in Bottom Tercile Q3 in Middle Tercile Q3 in Top Tercile
Dependent Variable: Ln (Income) in 1980 1991 2000 1980 1991 2000 1980 1991 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.027 -0.268 -0.003 0.220 0.118 0.253 0.350 1.006*** 0.535*
(0.321) (0.290) (0.237) (0.427) (0.378) (0.347) (0.351) (0.353) (0.313)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.416 -0.496 -0.033 0.385 0.194 0.498 -0.751 0.500 -0.104
(0.432) (0.386) (0.304) (0.564) (0.470) (0.426) (0.557) (0.454) (0.421)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.144 0.032 -0.395 0.100 -1.178* -0.822* 0.578 0.584 -0.462
(0.572) (0.444) (0.372) (0.555) (0.606) (0.496) (0.570) (0.634) (0.606)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.647** -1.920*** -1.127** -0.518 -0.595 -0.380 -0.653 -0.300 -0.610
(0.646) (0.635) (0.506) (0.849) (0.784) (0.721) (0.761) (0.880) (0.756)
Baseline controls
Observations 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,205 1,249 1,249 1,249
R2 0.659 0.559 0.703 0.662 0.723 0.822 0.761 0.747 0.765
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable is the mean per
capita family income in the year specified in the column header (in ln). The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each
of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. The sample is split into three groups according to the average per capita household income of
the individuals in the third quintile in 1970. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling
attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is
located on the coast. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 10: Income Shares in 1970, Population Growth and Migration from 1970 to 1980
Population Growth Immigration Rate Emigration Rate Fertility Rate Mortality Rate
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 -0.397 -0.167 0.240*** -0.033 -0.043
(0.383) (0.317) (0.053) (0.051) (0.107)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 -0.004 0.211 0.142* -0.036 0.037
(0.427) (0.356) (0.073) (0.064) (0.135)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.787 0.616 0.032 0.103 -0.101
(0.661) (0.466) (0.100) (0.105) (0.223)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.494** -0.627 0.232** -0.150 0.483**
(0.643) (0.506) (0.113) (0.105) (0.210)
Baseline controls
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.210 0.194 0.524 0.596 0.276
Dependent Variable Mean 0.137 0.258 0.190 0.242 0.174
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable in column 2 is the
immigration rate between 1970 and 1980, i.e., the ratio between the number of people living in the AMC in 1980 who were not living there in 1970 (or who belong
to a family in which the head was not living there in 1970 if aged less than 10) and the AMC’s population in 1970. The dependent variable in column 3 is the AMC’s
emigration rate in 1970-1980, calculated as the ratio between the number of people who reported the AMC as their previous residence but were not living there in
1980, and the AMC’s population in 1970. The dependent variable in column 4 is the AMC’s fertility rate in 1970-1980, computed as the ratio between the number
of children less than 10 year old living in the AMC in 1980 whose parents are non-immigrants and the AMC population in 1970. The dependent variable in column
5, which we refer to as mortality rate, is the ratio between the change in population between 1970 and 1980 not accounted for by fertility and migration and the
1970 population; this is a residual category, including not only people who passed away in 1970-1980, but also individuals who emigrated from the AMC but did
not report their municipality of origin. The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile
being the omitted category. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, illiteracy
rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 11: Income Shares and Subsequent Income – Panel Estimation
Fixed Effects GMM
Dependent Variable: Ln (Income)t+10 OLS (excl. lag. dep) (incl. lag. dep) FD System
Share of AMC income held by Q5t -0.126 -0.402** -0.318* -0.411* -0.267
(0.159) (0.162) (0.166) (0.228) (0.371)
Share of AMC income held by Q4t 0.364 0.571** 0.567** -0.033 0.357
(0.244) (0.263) (0.262) (0.329) (0.525)
Share of AMC income held by Q2t -0.261 -0.280 -0.222 0.551 0.079
(0.262) (0.271) (0.273) (0.360) (0.520)
Share of AMC income held by Q1t -1.659*** -1.421*** -1.177*** -1.439*** -1.808***
(0.334) (0.327) (0.334) (0.462) (0.658)
Lagged dependent variable
Time-varying controls
Time-invariant controls
Notes: This table presents the results of different panel estimations using AMC data for 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2000. Column 1 presents the results of
an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the mean per capita family income (in ln) in year t+10, and the explanatory variables of interest
are the shares of AMC income held by each of the quintiles in year t, with the third quintile being the omitted category. Time-varying controls
include year fixed effects, and controls for the AMC’s mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share
of urban population, and life expectancy in year t. Time-invariant controls include state fixed effects, latitude, longitude, distance from state and
federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. The OLS regressions in columns 2 and 3 include AMC fixed effects, but the regression
in column 2 also excludes the lagged dependent variable. Column 4 presents the results of a GMM estimation in which the regressors are expressed in
first differences, and all explanatory variables are instrumented using their lagged levels. Column 5 presents the results of a system GMM estimation,
where all regressors are assumed to be predetermined. All GMM estimations are conducted using the xtabond2 command developed by David
Roodman. Standard errors clustered by AMC are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
Figures A.1: Share of Income Held by Q1 Across Brazilian AMCs in 1970
Notes: Each unit is an A´rea Mı´nima Compara´vel (AMC) in 1970. Darker areas indicate greater share of income held by
Q1 in 1970.
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Figures A.2: Share of Income Held by Q5 Across Brazilian AMCs in 1970
Notes: Each unit is an A´rea Mı´nima Compara´vel (AMC) in 1970. Darker areas indicate greater share of income held by
Q5 in 1970.
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Table A.1: Income Inequality in 1970 and Subsequent Income
Log income
1980 1990 2000
Gini approximation 0.369*** 0.480*** 0.521***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.066)
Ln (1970 income) 0.386*** 0.296*** 0.230***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.017)
Avg years of education 0.082*** 0.096*** 0.092***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Illiteracy rate -0.170** -0.223*** -0.467***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.059)
Population (in 000s) 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share urban population 0.359*** 0.375*** 0.285***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.030)
Life expectancy 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Coastal AMC 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.078***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.858 0.849 0.877
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit
of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable is the mean per capita family income
in 1980, 1991 and 2000 (in ln). The 1970 Gini approximation based on quintile shares is
calculated using the formula in (2), and Ln (1970 income) is the mean per capita family
income in 1970 (in ln). All regressions also include state fixed effects and control for
latitude, longitude, and distance from state and federal capital. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A.2: Summary of Papers on Credit Constraints in Developing Countries
 
Paper Country Period
Number of 
firms
Sample restrictions
Firm characteristics
Entrepreneur characteristics 
(mean)
Treatment Findings
Invested capital
Monthly 
profits
Employees
Skoufias, Leite 
and Narita (2013)
Brazil 
(urban 
Northeast)
1998-2003 18,621
Less than five 
employees
-
US$ 262 
(mean)
0.39
Average age is 40. 23% 
have a high school 
education, and only 7% 
have more than high 
school
Availability of 
microcredit 
(average loan 
size is US$ 
256)
Rise in the use of credit by 48%, and 
46% increase in profits
McKenzie and 
Woodruff (2008)
Mexico 2005 200
Less than US$1,000 
in capital other than 
land and buildings. 
US$ 476 
(median) and 
US$ 522 (mean)
US$ 280 
(median) 
and US$ 
325 (mean)
0
Average age is 37. 7 
years of schooling (13% 
have lower secondary 
schooling, 20% have a 
upper secondary 
schooling, and only 7% 
have more than high 
school)
US$ 140 
grant (cash or 
equipment)
Average returns to capital of 20%-
33% per month, and higher returns 
for firms that report being financially 
constrained
de Mel, 
McKenzie and 
Woodruff (2008)
Sri Lanka 2005-2007 408
Less than US$1,000 
in capital other than 
land and buildings 
and no paid 
employees.
 US$ 180 
(median) and 
US$ 265 (mean) 
excluding land 
and buildings
US$ 30 
(median) 
and US$ 38 
(mean)
0
 Average age of 42 
years, and 9 years of 
education
US$ 100 or 
US$ 200 
grant (cash or 
equipment)
Average returns to capital of 5% per 
month, and higher returns for males 
and entrepreneurs that are more 
severely capital constrained (i.e., have 
high ability and few wage workers in 
the household who can provide 
liquidity)
Fafchamps et al. 
(2014)
Ghana 2009-2012 793
No paid employees 
and no motorized 
vehicle. 
US$ 137 
(median) and 
US$ 361 (mean)
US$ 54 
(median) 
and US$ 
104 (mean)
0
Average age of 36 
years, and 9 years of 
education 
US$ 120 
grant (cash or 
equipment)
Average returns to capital of 15% per 
month.  
Notes: This table summarizes the sample, methodology and results of Skoufias et al. (2013), McKenzie and Woodruff (2008), De Mel et al. (2008), and
Fafchamps et al. (2014).
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics – Sample Split by Average Income of Third Quintile in 1970
Q3 in Bottom Tercile Q3 in Middle Tercile Q3 in Top Tercile
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Average pc HH income by quintile in 1970 (in 2000 R$)
All quintiles 28.94 8.82 50.29 10.04 88.53 31.90
Q1 6.55 2.56 12.07 3.01 20.25 6.79
Q2 13.34 3.22 23.44 3.31 39.60 12.26
Q3 19.52 4.53 34.20 4.11 58.84 18.99
Q4 29.51 7.19 51.46 7.10 89.64 31.22
Q5 79.43 33.88 135.92 42.26 241.29 100.57
Other 1970 covariates
Years of schooling 0.74 0.38 1.28 0.56 2.07 0.78
Illiteracy rate 0.60 0.12 0.44 0.15 0.29 0.12
Population (in 000s) 14.83 16.07 16.75 22.63 44.09 223.97
Urban share 0.23 0.12 0.29 0.16 0.47 0.25
Life expectancy 48.62 3.99 51.41 3.84 53.23 3.64
Coastal AMC 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25
Observations 1,205 1,205 1,249
Notes: The unit of observation is an A´rea Mı´nima Compara´vel (AMC) over the period 1970-2000. There are
3,659 AMCs. The sample is split into three groups according to the average per capita household income of
the individuals in the third quintile in 1970.
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Table A.4: Income Shares and Share of Entrepreneurs in 1970
All Quintiles
Full Sample Restricted Sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 -0.175*** -0.206*** -0.151*** -0.146*** -0.265*** -0.223*** -0.244***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.043) (0.051) (0.058) (0.065) (0.066)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 -0.152** -0.187*** -0.067 -0.178** -0.316*** -0.131 -0.239***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.057) (0.070) (0.078) (0.088) (0.092)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 -0.026 -0.019 -0.064 0.179** -0.061 -0.107 -0.011
(0.086) (0.086) (0.082) (0.083) (0.106) (0.107) (0.111)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.333*** -0.367*** -0.360*** -0.321*** -0.548*** -0.418*** -0.262*
(0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.121) (0.133) (0.144)
Baseline controls
Observations 3,659 3,647 3,647 3,647 3,647 3,647 3,647
R2 0.511 0.512 0.401 0.462 0.482 0.486 0.502
Dependent Variable Mean 0.163 0.163 0.103 0.133 0.154 0.178 0.228
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions where the unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variable is the share of individuals in the quintile
specified in the column header who are self-employed or entrepreneurs in 1970. The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by
each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family
income, average schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal
capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. Column 1 includes the full set of AMCs, while the remaining columns exclude twelve small AMCs where
more than one quintile has zero income (in these cases, one cannot identify people belonging to quintile 1 and quintile 2, for example). Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A.5: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Income (Controlling for Sectoral Labor Shares)
Ln (Income)
1980 1991 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.167 -0.026 0.053
(0.232) (0.203) (0.175)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.118 -0.106 0.097
(0.332) (0.254) (0.228)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.345 -0.132 -0.347
(0.336) (0.324) (0.281)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.378*** -1.622*** -1.244***
(0.483) (0.463) (0.385)
Baseline controls
Sectoral labor force shares
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.861 0.853 0.881
P-value (Q4+Q2=0) 0.385 0.616 0.547
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.073 0.009 0.023
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of ob-
servation is an AMC. The dependent variable is the mean per capita family income in 1980, 1991
and 2000 (in ln). The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by
each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. Baseline controls include
state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attain-
ment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude,
distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. Labor force
shares are the share of occupied individuals in 1970 working in the 16 economic sectors defined in
the census. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A.6: Income Shares in 1970 and the Value of Firms’ Capital Stocks and Number of Establishments in 1980 (Controlling for Sectoral
Labor Shares)
Agriculture Commercial Manufacturing Services Total
Panel A: Value of Capital Stocks
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.055 -0.946 -3.558* -0.392 -0.656
(0.563) (0.855) (1.963) (1.202) (0.523)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.245 -0.768 -4.526* -0.413 0.273
(0.733) (1.196) (2.431) (1.682) (0.718)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.243 0.342 -2.965 -0.010 -0.001
(0.991) (1.403) (3.806) (1.980) (0.985)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -3.029** -4.361** -5.035 -2.656 -3.264***
(1.292) (1.910) (3.893) (2.432) (1.227)
Baseline controls
Lagged value of capital stocks
Sectoral labor force shares
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.792 0.731 0.636 0.665 0.834
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.081 0.041 0.112 0.366 0.015
Panel B: Number of Establishments
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.718** 0.114 -0.302 0.760 -0.201
(0.298) (0.406) (0.500) (0.537) (0.323)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.590 0.674 -0.786 1.237* -0.073
(0.396) (0.532) (0.672) (0.714) (0.434)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.737 0.750 0.109 1.196 1.006**
(0.512) (0.677) (0.834) (0.986) (0.512)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.438 -1.881** -0.993 -1.640 -1.502**
(0.651) (0.905) (1.143) (1.212) (0.697)
Baseline controls
Lagged number of establishments
Sectoral labor force shares
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R Squared 0.905 0.889 0.832 0.862 0.879
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.748 0.150 0.395 0.586 0.074
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC. The dependent variables in Panel A and B are the value of the AMC’s
private sector capital stocks (in ln) and the number of establishments in 1980 (in ln), for each productive sector, respectively. All dependent variables were calculated by IPEA from
the 1980 economic censuses. The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category.
Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life
expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. All regressions also control for lagged dependent variables in all
sectors. Labor force shares are the share of occupied individuals in 1970 working in the 16 economic sectors defined in the census. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A.7: Income Shares in 1970 and Educational Attainment in 1980 (Controlling for Sectoral Labor Shares)
Average years Share of people by years of education
of education < 4 years ≥ 4 and < 8 years ≥ 8 years
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.270 0.002 -0.027 0.025*
(0.230) (0.037) (0.035) (0.013)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.336 -0.026 0.003 0.024
(0.319) (0.052) (0.048) (0.018)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.533 -0.072 0.061 0.011
(0.369) (0.063) (0.057) (0.021)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -0.947* 0.163** -0.162** -0.001
(0.492) (0.080) (0.076) (0.027)
Baseline controls
Lagged education controls
Sectoral labor force shares
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.937 0.927 0.899 0.897
Dependent Variable Mean 2.073 0.742 0.196 0.062
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of observation is an AMC. The
dependent variables measure the average educational attainment in 1980 for individuals 25 years and older. The explanatory
variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the
omitted category. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family income, average
schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from
state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is located on the coast. All regressions also control for lagged educational
attainment variables (i.e., share of people according to their educational attainment in 1970). Sectoral labor force shares are
the share of occupied individuals in 1970 working in the 16 economic sectors defined in the census. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A.8: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Income (Imputing Top-Coded Incomes)
Ln(Income)
1980 1990 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.114 0.027 0.183
(0.227) (0.197) (0.170)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.129 -0.019 0.223
(0.330) (0.256) (0.229)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.316 -0.153 -0.383
(0.337) (0.321) (0.278)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.507*** -1.659*** -1.126***
(0.471) (0.454) (0.382)
Baseline controls
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.858 0.849 0.877
P-value (Q4+Q2=0) 0.406 0.717 0.697
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.034 0.008 0.067
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of
observation is an AMC. The dependent variable is the mean per capita family income in 1980,
1991 and 2000 (in ln). The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of 1970 AMC income
held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted category. Top-coded
incomes in 1970 are multiplied by a factor of 2.15 so that individual incomes in the top 20%
follow a Pareto distribution. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970
mean per capita family income, average schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share
of urban population, life expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital,
and whether the AMC is located on the coast. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A.9: Income Shares in 1970 and Subsequent Income (Including Collective Households and
Non-Family Members)
Ln (Income)
1980 1991 2000
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q5 0.322 0.205 0.372**
(0.225) (0.206) (0.172)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q4 0.297 0.149 0.434*
(0.326) (0.270) (0.232)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q2 0.510 -0.005 -0.175
(0.350) (0.330) (0.290)
Share of 1970 AMC income held by Q1 -1.355*** -1.482*** -1.000***
(0.477) (0.473) (0.383)
Baseline controls
Observations 3,659 3,659 3,659
R2 0.859 0.850 0.878
P-value (Q4+Q2=0) 0.134 0.766 0.539
P-value (Q5+Q1=0) 0.119 0.046 0.223
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS regressions based on equation (1). The unit of
observation is an AMC. For arriving at the AMC per capita family income distribution in 1970
we do not exclude individuals living in collective dwellings and those living in private dwellings
which are unrelated to the family head. The dependent variable is the mean per capita family
income in 1980, 1991 and 2000 (in ln). The explanatory variables of interest are the shares of
1970 AMC income held by each of the quintiles, with the third quintile being the omitted cate-
gory. Baseline controls include state fixed effects and controls for 1970 mean per capita family
income, average schooling attainment, illiteracy rate, population, share of urban population, life
expectancy, latitude, longitude, distance from state and federal capital, and whether the AMC is
located on the coast. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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